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ON THE CONVERGENCE OF A NASH SEEKING ALGORITHM
WITH STOCHASTIC STATE DEPENDENT PAYOFFS∗
A.F. HANIF†, H. TEMBINE‡, M. ASSAAD‡, D. ZEGHLACHE†
Abstract. Distributed strategic learning has been getting attention in recent years. As systems
become distributed finding Nash equilibria in a distributed fashion is becoming more important for
various applications. In this paper, we develop a distributed strategic learning framework for seeking
Nash equilibria under stochastic state-dependent payoff functions. We extend the work of Krstic
et.al. in [1] to the case of stochastic state dependent payoff functions. We develop an iterative
distributed algorithm for Nash seeking and examine its convergence to a limiting trajectory defined
by an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE). We show convergence of our proposed algorithm for
vanishing step size and provide an error bound for fixed step size. Finally, we conduct a stability
analysis and apply the proposed scheme in a generic wireless networks. We also present numerical
results which corroborate our claim.
Key words. Stochastic estimation, State-dependent Payoff, Extremum seeking, Sinus pertur-
bation, Nash Equilibrium.
1. Introduction. In this paper we consider a fully distributed system, which
consists of non cooperative nodes which can be modeled as a non cooperative game
for Nash seeking. Let us consider a distributed system with N nodes or agents which
interact with one another and each has a payoff/utility/reward to maximize. The
decision or action of each node has an impact on the reward of the other nodes, which
makes the problem challenging in general. In such systems each node has access to a
numerical value of their utility/reward at each time. In such systems it might not be
possible to have a bird’s eye view of the system as it is too complicated or is constantly
changing. Let aj,k be the action of node j at time k and the numerical value of the
utility of this node is given by r˜j,k. Where r˜j,k = rj(Sk, ak)+ ηj,k were ηj,k represents
noise , rj : S × RN+ −→ R is the payoff function of node j, Sk ∈ S ⊆ CN×N is the
state such that S is compact, ak = (a1,k, . . . , aN,k) is the action vector containing
actions of all nodes at time k. Figure 1.1 shows the system model where we have N
interacting nodes. The rewards are interdependent as the nodes interact with one
another. The only assumption that we can make here is the existence of a local
solution. Each of these nodes j has access to the numerical value of their respective
reward r˜j,k and it needs to implement a scheme to select an action aj,k such that its
utility is maximized. The above scenario can be interpreted as an interactive game.
In this paper we explore learning in such games which is synonymous with designing
distributed iterative algorithms that converge to the Nash equilibrium.
• Different approaches, mainly based on gradient descent or ascent method [3],
have been developed to achieve a local optimum (or global optimum in some special
cases, e.g. concavity of the payoff, etc.) of the distributed optimization problem.
The method of gradient ascent is also called steepest ascent method, which starts
at a point a0 and, as many times as needed, moves from ak to ak+1 by maximizing
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cations application of some of the results without proofs has been presented at SPAWC 2012.
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Fig. 1.1. Nodes interacting with each other through a dynamic environment
along the line extending from ak in the direction of ∇rj(Sk, ak), the local down-
hill gradient. This gives the iterative scheme aj,k+1 = aj,k + λk∇rj(Sk, ak) where
λk > 0 is a learning rate/step size. For the applicability of the above algorithm it
is necessary to have access to the value of ∇rj(.) at each time k. The action can
be positive and upper bounded by a certain maximum value aj,max > 0 for some
engineering applications. Thus, the component aj,k needs to be projected in the
domain [0, aj,max]. This leads to a projected gradient descent or ascent algorithms:
aj,k+1 = proj[0,aj,max] {aj,k + λk∇rj(Sk, ak)} where proj denotes the projection opera-
tor. At each time k, node j needs to observe/compute the gradient term ∇rj(Sk, ak).
Use of the aforementioned gradient based method requires the knowledge of (i) the
system state, (ii) the actions of others and their states and or (iii) the mathematical
structure (closed form expression) of the payoff function. As we can see, it will be
difficult for node j to compute the gradient if the expression for the payoff function
rj(.) is unknown and/or if the states and actions of other nodes are not observed as
rj(.) depends on the actions and states of others.
• There are several methods for Nash equilibrium seeking where we only have
access to the numerical value of the function at each time and not its gradient (e.g.
Complex functions which cannot be differentiated or unknown functions). Some of
them are detailed below.
The stochastic gradient ascent proposes to feedback the numerical value of gradi-
ent of reward function ∇rj of node j (which can be noisy) to itself. This supposes in
advance that a noisy gradient can be computed or is available at each node. Note that
if the numerical value of the gradients of the payoffs are not known by the players,
this scheme cannot be used. In [4] projected stochastic gradient based algorithm is
presented. A distributed asynchronous stochastic gradient optimization algorithms is
presented in [5]. Incremental Sub-gradient Methods for Non-differentiable Optimiza-
tion are discussed in [6]. A distributed Optimization algorithms for sensor networks
is presented in [7]. Interested readers are referred to a survey by Bertsekas [8] on
Incremental gradient, subgradient, and proximal methods for convex optimization.
In [9] the authors present Stochastic extremum seeking with applications to mobile
sensor networks.
• Krstic et.al. in recent years have contributed greatly to the field of non-model
2
based extremum seeking. In [1], the authors propose a Nash seeking algorithm for
games with continuous action spaces. They proposed a fully distributed learning
algorithm and requires only a measurement of the numerical value of the payoff.
Their scheme is based on sinus perturbation (i.e. deterministic perturbation instead of
stochastic perturbation) of the payoff function in continuous time. However, discrete
time learning scheme with sinus perturbations is not examined in [1]. In [10] extremum
seeking algorithm with sinusoidal perturbations for non-model based systems has been
extended and modified to the case of i.i.d. noisy measurements and vanishing sinus
perturbation, almost sure convergence to equilibrium is proved. Sinus perturbation
based extremum seeking for state independent noisy measurement is presented in
[11]. Kristic et al. [2] have recently extended Nash seeking scheme to stochastic
non-sinusoidal perturbations. In this paper we extend the work in [1] to the case of
stochastic state dependent payoff functions, and use deterministic perturbations for
Nash seeking. One can see easily the difference between this paper and the previous
existing works [10][11]. In these works, the noise ηj associated with the measurement
is i.i.d. which does not hold in practice especially in engineering application where
the noise is in general time correlated. In our case, we consider a stochastic state
dependent payoff function and our problem can be written in Robbins-Monro form
with a Markovian (correlated) noise given by ηj = rj(S, a) − ES[rj(S, a)] (this will
become clearer in the next sections), i.e. the associated noise is stochastic state
dependent which is different from the case of i.i.d. noise.
Although stochastic estimation techniques do estimate the gradient but they in-
troduce a level of uncertainty, to avoid this it is possible to introduce sinus perturba-
tion instead of stochastic perturbation. This is particularly helpful when one node is
trying to follow the actions of the other nodes in a certain application.
1.1. Contribution. In this paper, we propose a discrete time learning algo-
rithm, using sinus perturbation, for continuous action games where each node has
only a numerical realization of the payoff at each time. We therefore extend the clas-
sical Nash Seeking with sinus perturbation method [1] to the case of discrete time and
stochastic state-dependent payoff functions. We prove that our algorithm converges
locally to a state independent Nash equilibrium in Theorem 1 for vanishing step size
and provide an error bound in Theorem 2 for fixed step size. Note that since the
payoff function may not necessarily be concave, finding a global optimum at afford-
able complexity can be difficult in general even in deterministic case (fixed state) and
known closed-form expression of payoff. We also show the convergence time for the
sinus framework in Corollary 1. In this paper we analyze and prove that the algo-
rithm converges to a limiting ODE. We provide the convergence time and error bound
between our discrete time algorithm and the ODE.
The proof of the theorems are given in Appendix A.
1.2. Structure of the paper. The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides the proposed distributed stochastic learning algorithm. The
performance analysis of the proposed algorithm (convergence to ODE, error bounds)
is presented in section 3. A numerical example with convergence plots is provided in
section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. Appendix contains the proofs.
1.3. Notations. We summarize some of the notations in Table 1.1.
2. Problem Formulation and Proposed Algorithm. Let there be N dis-
tributed nodes each with a payoff function represented by rj(Sk, aj,k, a−j,k) at time
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Table 1.1
Summary of Notations
Symbol Meaning
N set of nodes
Aj set of choices of node j,
S state space
rj payoff of node j
aj,k decision of j at time k
a−j,k (aj′,k)j′ 6=j
E expectation operator
∇ gradient operator
k which is used to formulate the following robust problems:
sup
aj≥0
ESrj(S, aj , a−j) ∀ j ∈ N , {1, . . . , N} (2.1)
A solution to the problem (2.1) is called state-independent equilibrium solution.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium (state-independent)). a∗ = (a∗j , a
∗
−j) ∈
∏
j′ Aj′
is a (state-independent) Nash equilibrium point if
ESrj(S, a
∗
j , a
∗
−j) ≥ ESrj(S, a′j , a∗−j), ∀a′j ∈ Aj , a′j 6= a∗j (2.2)
where ES denotes the mathematical expectation over the state.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium (state-dependent)). We define a state-dependent
strategy a˜j of a node j as a mapping from S to the action space Aj . The set of state-
dependent strategy is PGj : {a˜j : S −→ Aj , S 7−→ a˜j(S) ∈ Aj}.
a˜∗ = (a˜∗j , a˜
∗
−j) ∈
∏
i
PGi
is a (state-dependent) Nash equilibrium point if
ESrj(S, a˜
∗
j (S), a˜
∗
−j(S)) ≥ ESrj(S, a˜′j(S), a˜∗−j(S)), ∀a˜′j ∈ PGj (2.3)
Here we define a := (aj , a−j) Assuming that node j has access to it’s realized payoff
at each time k but the closed-form expression of rj(Sk, aj,k, a−j,k) is unknown to node
j. A solution to the above problem is a state-independent equilibrium in the sense no
node has incentive to change its action when the other nodes keep their choice. It
is well-known that equilibria can be different than global optima, the gap between
the worse equilibrium and the global maximizer is captured by the so-called price of
anarchy. Thus solution obtained by our method can be suboptimal with respect to
maximizing the sum of all the payoffs. We study the local stability of the stochastic
algorithm.
The robust game is defined as follows: N is the set of nodes, Aj is the action
space of node j. S is the state space of the whole system, where S ⊆ CN×N ; and
rj : S ×
∏
j′∈N Aj′ −→ R is a smooth function. It should be mentioned here for
clarity that the decisions are taken in a decentralized fashion by each node. Let us
continue by stating that N is the set of nodes, Aj is the action space of node j, S is
the state space of the whole system, where S ⊆ CN×N and rj : S×
∏
j′∈N Aj′ −→ R.
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Games with uncertain payoffs are called robust games. Since state can be stochas-
tic, we get a robust game. Here we will focus on the analysis of the so-called expected
robust game i.e (N ,Aj ,ESrj(S, .)). A (state-independent) Nash equilibrium point [14]
of the above robust game is a strategy profile such that no node can improve its payoff
by unilateral deviation, see Definition 1 and Definition 2.
Since the current state is not observed by the nodes, it will be difficult to im-
plement state-dependent strategy. Our goal is to design a learning algorithm for a
state-independent equilibrium given in Definition 1. In what follows we assume that
we are in a setting where the above problem has at least one isolated state-independent
equilibrium solution. More details on existence of equilibria can be found in Theorem
3 in [15].
2.1. Learning algorithm. Suppose that each node j is able to observe a nu-
merical value r˜j,k of the function rj(Sk, ak) at time k, where ak = (aj,k, a−j,k) is
the action of node j at time k. aˆj,k is an intermediary variable. aj , Ωj φj repre-
sent the amplitude frequency and phase of the sinus perturbation signal given by
bj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj), r˜j,k+1 represents the payoff at time k + 1. The learning algorithm
is presented in Algorithm 1 and is explained below. At each time instant k, each
node updates its action aj,k, by adding the sinus perturbation i.e. bj sin(Ωj kˆ+φj) to
the intermediary variable aˆj,k using equation (2.4), and makes the action using aj,k.
Then, each node gets a realization of the payoff r˜j,k+1 from the dynamic environment
at time k+1 which is used to compute aˆj,k+1 using equation (2.5). The action aj,k+1
is then updated using equation (2.4). This procedure is repeated for the window T .
The algorithm is in discrete time and is given by
aj,k = aˆj,k + bj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj) (2.4)
aˆj,k+1 = aˆj,k + λkzjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj)r˜j,k+1 (2.5)
where kˆ :=
∑k
k′=1 λk′ , Ωj 6= Ωj′ ,Ωj′ +Ωj 6= Ωj′′ ∀j, j′, j′′.
For almost sure convergence, it is usual to consider vanishing step-size or learn-
ing rate such as λk =
1
k+1 . However, constant learning rate λk = λ could be more
appropriate in some regime. The parameter φj belongs to [0, 2π]∀ j, k ∈ Z+
Algorithm 1 Distributed learning algorithm
1: Each node j, initialize aˆj,0 and transmit
2: Repeat
3: Calculate action aj,k according to Equation (2.4)
4: Perform action aj,k
5: Observe r˜j,k
6: Update aˆj,k+1 using Equation (2.5)
7: until horizon T
Remark 1 (Learning Scheme in Discrete Time). As we will prove in subsection
3.1, the difference equation (2.4) can be seen as a discretized version of the learning
scheme presented in [1]. But it is for games with state-dependent payoff functions
i.e., robust games. It should be mentioned here for clarity that the action aj,k of
each node j is scalar.
2.2. Interpretation of the proposed algorithm. In some sense our algorithm
is trying to estimate the gradient of the function rj(.), but we don’t have access to
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the function but just its numerical value. The following equation clearly illustrated
the significance of each variable and constant in the algorithm.
aˆj,k+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
New
Value
= aˆj,k
︸︷︷︸
Old
Value
+
Learning
Rate
︷︸︸︷
λk zj
︸︷︷︸
Growth
Rate
bj
︸︷︷︸
Perturbation
Amplitude
sin(
Perturbation
Frequency
︷︸︸︷
Ωj kˆ + φj
︸︷︷︸
Perturbation
Phase
)
New
Reward
︷ ︸︸ ︷
r˜j,k+1 (2.6)
The learning rate λk can be constant or variable depending on the requirement
for the algorithm and system limitations. Perturbation amplitude bj > 0 is a small
number. zj > is also a small value which can be varied for fine tuning. Rewriting the
above equation we get
aˆj,k+1 − aˆj,k
λk
= zjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj)r˜j,k+1 (2.7)
For vanishing step size as k −→ ∞ λk −→ 0 and the trajectory of the above
algorithm coincides with the trajectory of the ODE in equation (3.11)
3. Main results. In this section we present the convergence results as intro-
duced in the contribution section.
We introduce the following assumptions that will be used step by step1.
Assumption 1 (A1: Vanishing learning rate). λk > 0,
∑
k λk =∞,
∑
k |λk|2 <
∞. There exists C0 > 0 such that P (supk ‖ ak ‖< C0) = 1. The reason for A1 is that
λk represents the step size of the algorithm. So the sum over all
∑
k λk = ∞ as it
needs to traverse over all discrete time. The condition
∑
k |λk|2 < ∞ ensures bound
for the cumulative noise error. This last assumption is for a local stability analysis.
Assumption 2 (A2: Constant learning rate). λt = λ > 0, supt[E‖at‖2] 12 < +∞
and ‖at‖2 is uniformly integrable.
Assumption 3 (A3:Existence of a local maximizer). ES
∂rj(S,a
∗)
∂aj
= 0, ES
∂2rj(S,a
∗)
∂a2
j
<
0. These two conditions tell us that a∗j is a local maximizer of aj −→ ESrj(S, aj , a∗−j)
where a∗−j = (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
j−1, a
∗
j+1, . . . , a
∗
t ).
Assumption 4 (A4: Diagonal Dominance). the expected payoff has a Hessian
that is diagonally dominant at a∗, i.e.,
∣∣∣ES (∂2rj(S,a∗)∂a2
j
)∣∣∣−∑j′ 6=j ∣∣∣ES (∂2rj(S,a∗)∂aj∂aj′ )
∣∣∣ >
0. Note that A4 implies that the Hessian of the expected payoff is invertible at a∗. This
assumption is weaker compared to the classical extremum seeking algorithm because
the Hessian of rj(S, a
∗) does not need to be invertible for each S.
We assume S 7−→ rj(S, a) is integrable with respect to S so that the expectation
ESrj(S, a) is finite.
3.1. Convergence to ODE.
Stochastic approximation. First we need to show that our proposed algorithm
converges to the respective ODE almost surely. We will use a dynamical system
viewpoint and stochastic approximation method to analyze our learning algorithm.
The idea consists of finding the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of the algorithm via
ordinary differential equation (ODE). To do so, we use the framework initiated by
1We do not use A1 and A2 simultaneously.
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Robbins-Monro[16] or [17]. See [18, 12] for recent development. The works in [18, 12]
allows us to find the limiting trajectory of the learning algorithm.
Our scheme can be written as aˆj,k+1 = aˆj,k + λkzjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj)r˜j,k+1. Now
we rewrite the above equation in Robbins-Monro [16] form as: aˆj,k+1 = aˆj,k +
λk [fj(k, ak) +Mk+1] , where fj(k, ak) , zjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj)ESrj(S, ak),
Mk+1 , zjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj) [r˜j,k+1 − ESrj(S, ak)] .
Since our payoff rj is Lebesgue integrable with respect to S, expectation of payoff
function ESrj(S, a) is finite. Mk+1 is clearly a martingale adapted to the filtration
Fk generated by the random variable Sk′ , k′ ≤ k and the initial law of a0. Moreover
Mk+1 has a zero mean. Thus, Mk+1 is a difference martingale.
Theorem 1 (Variable Learning Rate). Under Assumption A1, the learning al-
gorithm converges almost surely to the trajectory of a non-autonomous system given
by
d
dt
aˆj,t = zjbj sin(Ωjt+ φj)ES (rj(S, at))
aj,t = aˆj,t + bj sin(Ωjt+ φj)
The gap between the interpolated version of algorithm and the solution of the
ODE is bounded by
sup
t∈[tk,tk+T ]
‖a¯(t)− atk(t)‖ ≤ KT,teLT + CTλt+k
which vanishes, where a¯(t) is the interpolated version of the algorithm and atk(t)
is the solution of the ODE at time t starting from tk :=
∑k
t′=0 λt′ , where L is the
Lipschitz constant for the ODE and T is the time window. KT,t is specified below.
In order to calculate the bound we need to define a few terms which are helpful
in obtaining a compact form of the bound.
KT,t , CTL
∑
k≥0
λ2t+k + sup
k≥0
‖δt,t+k‖ (3.1)
δt,t+k , ξt+k − ξt (3.2)
ξt ,
t−1∑
m=0
λmMm+1 (3.3)
CT , ‖r(0)‖+ L(C0 + ‖r(0)‖T )eLT <∞ (3.4)
To prove that the learning algorithm (discrete ODE) converges to the ODE we
need to verify conditions from Borkar [12] Chapter 2 Lemma 1.
lim
t−→∞
sup
s∈[t,t+T ]
‖a˜s − a∗s‖ = 0 a.s.
This is an important result as it gives us an approximation on the error between
our algorithm and the corresponding ODE.
Theorem 2 (Fixed Learning Rate). Under Assumption A2, the learning algo-
rithm converges in distribution when λ −→ 0, to the trajectory of a non-autonomous
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system given by
d
dt
aˆj,t = zjbj sin(Ωjt+ φj)ES (rj(S, at)) (3.5)
aj,t = aˆj,t + bj sin(Ωjt+ φj) (3.6)
Moreover the error gap is in order of λ. As λ converges to zero, the algorithm con-
verges (in distribution) to the ODE.
The advantage of Theorem 2 compared to Theorem 1 is the convergence time. The
number of iterations required to reach a fixed time T is less with constant learning rate
than the vanishing learning rate. However, the convergence notion under constant step
size is weaker (it is in distribution) compared to the almost surely convergence with
vanishing learning rate. So there is a sort of tradeoff between almost sure convergence
and convergence time.
Let ∆t be the gap between the ODE and the isolated equilibrium at time t.
Theorem 3 (Exponential Stability). Assume A3-A4 and Remark 3,4 holds.
Then, there exist M´, m´ > 0 and ǫ¯, b¯j such that, for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ¯) and bj ∈ (0, b¯j), if
the initial gap is ∆0 (which is small) then for all time t,
∆t ≤ y1,t (3.7)
where
y1,t , M´e
−m´t∆0 +O(ǫ +max
j
b3j) (3.8)
Proof. [Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3]
Local stability proof of Theorem 3 follows the steps in [13].
From the above equation it is clear that as time goes to infinity the first term in y1,t
bound vanishes exponentially and the error is bounded by the amplitude of the sinus
perturbation i.e. O(ǫ + maxj b
3
j). This means that the solution of ODE converges
locally exponentially to the state-independent equilibrium action a∗ provided the
initial solution is relatively close.
Definition 3 (ǫ−Nash equilibrium payoff point). An ǫ−Nash equilibrium point
in state-independent strategy is a strategy profile such that no node can improve its
payoff more than ǫ by unilateral deviation.
Definition 4 (ǫ−close Nash equilibrium strategy point). An ǫ−close Nash equi-
librium point in state-independent strategy is a strategy profile such that the Euclidean
distance to a Nash equilibrium is less than ǫ. A ǫ−close Nash equilibrium point is an
approximate Nash point with a precision at most ǫ.
It is not difficult to see that for Lipschitz continuous payoff functions, an ǫ−close
Nash equilibrium is an Lǫ−Nash equilibrium point where L is the Lipschitz constant.
Next corollary shows that one can get an ǫ−close Nash equilibrium in finite time.
Corollary 1 (Convergence Time). Assume A3-A4 and Remark 3,4 holds.
Then, the ODE reaches a (2ǫ + maxj b
3
j)−close to a Nash equilibrium in at most
T time units where T = 1m´ log(
∆0M´
ǫ )
Proof. [Sketch of Proof for Corollary 1] The proof follows from the inequality
(3.7) in Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 (Convergence to the ODE). Under Assumption A1, A3, and A4,
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the following inequality holds almost surely: ‖ a˜t − a∗ ‖≤ y1,t + y2,t where
y2,t , CT (λt+k + L
∑
k′≥0
λ2t+k′ ) + sup
k′≥0
‖δt,t+k′‖ (3.9)
Proof. [Proof of Corollary 2] The proof uses the triangle inequality ‖ a˜t− a∗ ‖≤‖
a˜t − at ‖ + ‖ at − a∗ ‖ . By Theorem 1, one gets ‖ a˜t − at ‖≤ y1,t and by Theorem 3,
one has ‖ at − a∗ ‖≤ y2,t Combining together, one arrives at the announced result.
Then constants in equation (3.8) and (3.9) depends on the number of players and
the dimension of the action space.
3.2. Convergence of the stochastic ODE. In this subsection we study the
stochastic ODE given by
aj,t = aˆj,t + bj sin(Ωjt+ φj) (3.10)
d
dt
aˆj,t = zjbj sin(Ωjt+ φj)r˜j,t (3.11)
where rj,t is the realization of the state-dependent payoff rj(St, at) at time t. We
assume the state process is ergodic so that,
lim
T−→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
µj(t)rj(St, at) dt = lim
T−→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
µj(t)ESrj(S, at) dt
In particular the asymptotic drift of the deterministic ODE and the stochastic ODE
are the same. Hence, the following theorem follows:
Theorem 4 (Almost sure exponential stability). The stochastic algorithm 1
converges asymptotically almost surely to the stochastic ODE in equation (3.11) i.e.
P (‖ a˜t − a∗ ‖≤ y1,t + y2,t) = 1 a.s.
Since the state process is ergodic, we can apply the stochastic averaging theorem
from [2] to get the announced result.
4. Numerical Example: A Generic Wireless Network with Interfer-
ence. Even though the distributed optimization problem, considered in this paper,
and the developed approach are general and can be used in many application domains.
As an application of the above framework, we will consider the problem of power con-
trol in wireless networks in order to better illustrate our contribution. Consider an
interference channel composed of N transmit receiver pairs as shown in Figure 4.1.
Each transmitter communicates with its corresponding receiver and incurs an inter-
ference on the other receivers. Each receiver feeds back a numerical value of the payoff
γ˜j(H,p) to its corresponding transmitter.
The problem is composed of transmitter-receiver pairs; all of them use the same
frequency and thus generate interference onto each other. Each transmitter-receiver
pair has therefore its own payoff/reward/utility function that depends necessarily on
the interference exerted by the other pairs/nodes. Since the wireless channel is time
varying as well as the interference, the objective is necessarily to optimize in the long-
run (e.g. average) the payoff functions of all the nodes. The payoff function of node j
at time k is denoted by rj(Hk,pk) where Hk := [hk(i, j)] represents an N×N matrix
containing channel coefficients at time k, hk(i, j) represents the channel coefficient
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between transmitter i and receiver j (where (i, j) ∈ N 2) and pk represents the vector
containing transmit powers ofN transmit-receive nodes. The most common technique
used to obtain a local maximum of the nodes’ payoff functions is the gradient based
descent or ascent method.
Remark 2.
Table 4.1
Equivalent Notations for Wireless
General Application Description
r˜j,k γ˜j,k utility/payoff of transmitter j at time k
aj,k pj,k action/power of transmitter j at time k
sjj′,k gjj′,k state/channel gain between transmitter
j and receiver j′ at time k
Rx1Tx1
g11
γ˜1
...
gj1
TxN
gN
1
...
g
1jgjj
γ˜j
gNj
RxN
g
1N
g
jNgNN
γ˜N
Fig. 4.1. Interference Channel Model
In section 3, we proved that our proposed algorithm converges to p∗ for any
type of payoff functions which satisfies the assumptions in section 3.1. In order to
show numerically that our algorithm converges to p∗, we run our algorithm for a
simple payoff function. In parallel, we obtain analytically the Nash equilibrium p∗
and compare the convergence point of our algorithm to p∗. We therefore choose a
simple payoff function for which p∗ can be obtained analytically.
The payoff function of node j at time k has then the following form:
γ˜j(Hk,pk) = ω︸︷︷︸
bandwidth
log(1 +
pj,kgjj,k
σ2 +
∑
j′ 6=j pj′,kgj′j,k
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rate
− κpj,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
constraint on powers
where ω represents the bandwidth available for transmission. The above payoff func-
tion γ˜j(Hk,pk) consists of log of (1+SINR) of user j and the unit cost of transmission
is κ. It is assumed that a used doesn’t know the structure function γ˜j(.) or the law
of the channel state. For the above payoff function to ensure the assumption A3-A4
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and Remark 3,4 we need to satisfy the condition E|hjj |2 ≥ E
∑
j′ 6=j |hj′j |2. Please
see appendix for more details.
The problem here is to maximize the payoff function γ˜j(H,p) which is stated as
follows: find p∗ such that for each user j ∈ N , satisfies
p∗j ∈ argmaxpj≥0 Eγ˜j(H, p∗1, . . . , p∗j−1, pj, p∗j+1, . . . , p∗N). Note that when gjj = 0 then
the payoff of user j is negative and the minimum power p∗j = 0 is a solution to the
above problem. For the remaining, we assume that |hjj |2 = gjj > 0.
The channel hj,j′ is time varying and is generated using an independent and
identically distributed complex gaussian channel model with variance σ2jj′ such that
σjj = 1 σjj′ = 0.1, j
′ 6= j. The thermal noise is assumed to be a zero mean gaussian
with variance σ2 such that σ2 = 1.
We consider the following simulation settings with N = 2 for the above wireless
model: k1 = 0.9, k2 = 0.9, φ1 = 0, φ2 = 0,Ω1 = 0.9,Ω2 = 1, b1 = 0.9, b2 = 0.9.
The numerical setting could be tuned in order to make the convergence slower or
faster with some other tradeoff. Due to space limitations further discussion on how to
select these parameters has been omitted. p1,0 and p2,0 represent the starting points
of the algorithm which are initialized as p1,0 = p
∗
1 + 10 and p2,0 = p
∗
2 + 10. κ = 2
is the penalty for interference, ω = 10 is the bandwidth and the variance of noise
is normalized. Figure 4.2 represents the average transmit power trajectories of the
algorithm for two nodes. The dotted line represents p∗. As can be seen from the plots
that the system converges to p∗ where p∗j = 3.9604, j ∈ {1, 2}.
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Time
Po
w
er
Realtime
 
 
User1
User2
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Time
Po
w
er
Averaged
 
 
User1
User2
Fig. 4.2. Power evolution (discrete time)
The example we discussed is only one of the possible types of applications where
our proposed algorithm can be implemented.
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Fig. 4.3. Payoff evolution (discrete time)
Consider for example the following payoffs: q1(.) = goodput(.) and q2(.) =
P(goodput(.) < η) where η is a small value and P(.) stands for probability. Goodput
represents the ratio of correctly received information bits vs the number of trans-
mitter bits. In wireless communications the channel is constantly changing due to
various physical phenomenon and interference from other sources and changes in the
environment. It is hard to have a closed form expression for q1(.) due to complexity
of the transmitter, receiver and unknown parameters. In practice, at each time k, the
receiver has therefore a numerical value of goodput(.) but no closed form expression
for rate/goodput is available especially for advanced coding scheme (e.g. turbo code,
etc.). q2(.) represents an outage probability for which also depends on the goodput,
the gradient for q2(.) is notoriously hard to compute without channel and interference
statistics knowledge (probability distribution function) and closed form expression of
goodput(.). Our scheme can be particularly helpful in such scenarios.
The price/design parameter κ inside the reward function can be tuned such that
the solution of the distributed robust extremum coincides with a global optimizer of
the system designer. The κ can be same for all nodes or each node can have its own
κj . Let a
∗
g represent the optimal action or set of actions to be performed by each node
to maximize their respective utilities. It is possible to set κ such that the following
equation is satisfied.a(κ) = a∗g. κ could represent a scalar or a vector depending on
the system size and the application. To be able to effectively make a(κ) equal to a∗
we need to have enough degrees of freedom in the system. However this type of tuning
is not true in general.
5. Concluding remarks.
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Work Presented: In this paper we have presented a Nash seeking algorithm which is
able to find the local minima using just the numerical value of the stochastic
state dependent payoff function at each discrete time sample. We proved
the convergence of our algorithm to a limiting ODE. We have provided as
well the error bound for the algorithm and the convergence time to be in
a close neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium. A numerical example for a
generic wireless network is provided for illustration. The convergence bounds
achieved by our method are dependent on the step size and the perturbation
amplitude.
New Class of Functions: In this work we introduced a new class of state depen-
dent payoff functions rj(S, a) which are inspired from wireless systems appli-
cations. But these kind of functions are more general and appear in other
application areas.
Achievable Bounds: As it is clear from results in Theorem 1 that convergence
depends on an exponential term and the amplitude of the sinus perturbation.
As amplitude becomes smaller, the error bound also vanishes. In contrast the
standard stochastic subgradient method only depend on the step size.
Global Analysis: All the work considered in this paper including Krstic et.al. con-
sider local stability. Our work is an extension of their work and works for
local stability. The future work will focus on the extension to the case of
Global Stability of Nash equilibrium for both deterministic and stochastic
payoff functions.
Multidimensional Aspect: The presented work has been studied for scalar reward
and scalar action by each node. Scalar scenario has several applications to
wireless (as in the aforementioned example) and sensor networks and numer-
ous examples can be considered. A possible extension to this work could be
in the direction of vector actions where each users is able to perform multiple
actions based on multiple rewards.
Appendix A. Convergence Theorems.
A.1. Variable Step Size: Proof of Theorem 1. The Theorem 1 states that
Under Assumption A1, the learning algorithm converges almost surely to the trajec-
tory of a non-autonomous system given by
d
dt
aˆj,t = zjbj sin(Ωjt+ φj)ES (rj(S, at))
aj,t = aˆj,t + bj sin(Ωjt+ φj)
The proof follows in several steps.
• The first step provides conditions for Lipschitz continuity of the expected
payoff which is given in Lemma 1. From Lemma 2 we have that ∀j, t, fj(t, a) ,
bjzj sin(Ωjt+ φj)ESrj(S, a), is Lipschitz over the domain D
• Second step: the learning rates are chosen such that they satisfy assumption
A1.
• Third step: we check the noise conditions.
Lemma 1. Let
(S, a) 7−→ rj(S, a)∀S ∈ S, ∃ Lj,S such that
(C1) : ‖rj(S, a)− rj(S, a′)‖ ≤ Lj,S‖a− a′‖ ∀(a, a′) ∈ A
(C2) : ESLj,S < +∞
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then the mapping a 7−→ ESrj(S, a) is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant Lj = ESLj,S
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 1] Suppose that a 7−→ ESrj(S, a) is Lipschitz with
Lipschitz constant Lj,S, then by Jensen’s inequality one has
‖ESrj(S, a)− ESrj(S, a′)‖ ≤ ES‖rj(S, a)− rj(S, a′)‖
By condition C2, ESLj,S < +∞. Let Lj be ESLj,S. Then
‖ESrj(S, a)− ESrj(S, a′)‖ ≤ Lj‖a− a′‖
This completes the proof.
Remark 3.
• Note that under C1 and C2 the expected payoff vector r = (rj)j∈N is Lipschitz
continuous with L˜ = maxj Lj,
• If S is a compact set and S 7−→ Lj,S is continuous then a 7−→ ESrj(S, a) is
Lipschitz [In particular, the condition C2 is not needed]
We shall prove the above remark by Reductio ad absurdum. To prove the sec-
ond statement of Remark 3 we use compactness and continuity argument. We start
from Bolzano–Wierstrass theorem which states that. For any k, any continuous map
x 7−→ f(k, a) over a compact set D has at least one maximum, i.e., sup f(k, a) =
maxa∈D f(k, a) < ∞. The proof of this statement can be easily done by contradic-
tion. Suppose sup f(k, a) = ∞. Then there exists a sequence (al)l such that al ∈ D
but f(k, al) −→ ∞ as l goes to infinity. This is impossible because D is compact
which implies that f(k,D) = {f(k, a) |a ∈ D} is bounded by continuity.
Since S is compact and S 7−→ LS is continuous, supS∈S LS is also finite.
Remark 4. If rj(S, a) is continuously differentiable with the respect to a then it
is sufficient to check the expectation of the gradient is bounded (in norm).
if S is in Euclidean Space
• rj is differentiable w.r.t a
• rj(S, a), ∇arj(S, a) are continuous in S
• rj(S, a), ∇arj(S, a) are absolutely integrable in S and ESrj(S, a) is continu-
ous in a.
then
E[∇arj(S, a)] = ∇aE[rj(S, a)]
which can be written as∫
S
∇arj(S, a)γ(dS) = ∇a
∫
S
rj(S, a)γ(dS)
where γ is the measure of S state space. For more details on the above conditions
please refer to [19].
Since fj is a function of time and the actions of nodes, we need a uniform Lipschitz
condition on fj.
We have
|fj(t, a)− fj(t, a′)| ≤ bjzj| sin(Ωjt+ φ)| [‖ESrj(S, a)− ESrj(S, a′)‖]
But one has | sin(.)| ≤ 1. Hence,
|fj(t, a) − fj(t, a′)| ≤ bjzj [‖ESrj(S, a) − ESrj(S, a′)‖]
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We use Lemma 1,
|fj(t, a)− fj(t, a′)| ≤ bjzjLj‖a− a′‖
This implies that the Lipschitz constant of fj is less than the one of rj times the factor
bjzj.
Finally, we check the noise conditions. The recursion equation is given by
aj,k+1 = aj,k + λk[fj(k, ak) +Mj,k+1]
where Mj,k+1 is a martingale difference sequence. By definition the martingale
sequence for the algorithm is given as
Mj,k+1 , zjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj) [r˜j,k+1 − ES[r˜j,k+1(S, ak+1)]]
which satisfied the condition E[Mk+1|Fk] = 0 for k ≥ 0 almost surely (a.s.)
Lemma 2. If ak ∈ D then the martingale is square-integrable with
E[‖Mk+1‖2|Fk] ≤ c´(1 + ‖ak‖2) ∀k
Proof. [Proof of Lemma 2]
Let r˜j,k+1 be the realization the payoff at time k + 1. The expected value of this
random variable can be bounded above the norm of ak.
Mj,k+1 = zjbj sin(Ωj kˆ + φj)(r˜j,k+1 − ES[r˜j,k+1(S, ak+1)])
‖Mj,k+1‖ ≤ |zj ||bj ||(sin(Ωj kˆ + φj)|‖r˜j,k+1 − ES[r˜j,k+1(S, ak+1)]‖)
≤ zjbj(‖r˜j,k+1‖+ ‖ES[r˜j,k+1(S, ak+1)]‖)
≤ zjbj(‖r˜j,k+1‖+ ES‖r˜j,k+1(S, ak+1)‖)
≤ zb(‖r˜j,k+1‖+ ES‖r˜j,k+1(S, ak+1)‖)
Where | sin(.)| ≤ 1, z , max |zj|, b , max |bj|, ‖r˜j,k+1‖ is bounded because of
the Lipschitz condition as mentioned in C1, which is shown below.
‖rj(S, ak)− rj(S, 0)‖ ≤ Lj,S‖ak − 0‖ ∀(ak) ∈ A (A.1)
‖rj(S, ak)‖ ≤ ‖rj(S, 0)‖+ Lj,S‖ak‖
≤ β1,S + Lj,S‖ak‖
Where β1,S , ‖rj(S, 0)‖. The above equations A.1 show that ‖rj(S, a)‖ is bounded
by β1,S + Lj,S‖a‖. By taking expectation of the above set of inequalities we get.
ES‖rj(S, ak)‖ ≤ ES‖rj(S, 0)‖+ ESLj,S‖ak‖ (A.2)
≤ Lj‖ak‖+ ES‖rj(S, 0)‖
≤ Lj‖ak‖+ β2
Where β2 , ES‖rj(S, 0), Lj , ESLj,S. The above set of inequalities A.2 show that
ES‖rj(S, a)‖ is bounded.
Combining the results of inequalities in A.1 A.2 we can get
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‖Mj,k+1‖2 ≤ z2b2(β1,S + Lj,S‖ak‖+ Lj‖ak‖+ β2)2
≤ 2z2b2((β1,S + β2)2 + (Lj,S + Lj)2‖ak‖2)
≤ 4z2b2(β21,S + β22 + (L2j,S + L2j)‖ak‖2)
Taking ES over the above inequalities we get:
ES‖Mj,k+1‖2 ≤ 4z2b2(ESβ21,S + β22 + (ESL2j,S + L2j)‖ak‖2)
≤ 4z2b2(β + L`j‖ak‖2)
≤ c´(1 + ‖ak‖2)
Where L`j , ESL
2
j,S + L
2
j , β , ESβ
2
1,S + β
2
2 and c´ ≥ 4z2b2(β + L`j)
This completes the proof.
We now combine the above three steps to derive almost sure convergence to an
ODE. To do so, we interpolate the stochastic process ak (an affine interpolation) in
order to get a continuous time process following the lines of Borkar [12] Chapter 2
Lemma 1. The gap between the solution of the non-autonomous differential equation
given by
d
dt
at = f(t, at)
and the interpolated process vanishes almost surely for asymptotic interval of length
T > 0.
lim
t−→∞
sup
q∈[t,t+T ]
‖a˜q − a∗q‖ = 0 a.s.
In order to calculate the bound we need to define a few terms which are helpful in
obtaining a compact form of the bound.
sup
t∈[tk,tk+T ]
‖a˜(t)− atk(t)‖ ≤ KT,teLT + CTλt+k´
= CT (λt+k´ + L
∑
k´≥0
λ2
t+k´
)
+ sup
k´≥0
‖δt,t+k´‖
where
KT,t , CTL
∑
k´≥0
λ2
t+k´
+ sup
k´≥0
‖δt,t+k´‖
δt,t+k´ , ξt+k´ − ξt
ξt ,
t−1∑
m=0
λmMm+1
CT , ‖r(0)‖+ L(C0 + ‖r(0)‖T )eLT <∞
P
(
sup
k´
‖ak´‖ < C0
)
= 1
then we conclude by discrete adaptation of Lemma 1 in Borkar [12].
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A.2. Fixed Step Size: Proof of Theorem 2. Theorem 2 states that Under
Assumption A2, the learning algorithm converges in distribution to the trajectory of
a non-autonomous system given by
d
dt
aˆj,t = zjbj sin(Ωjt+ φj)ES (rj(S, at))
aj,t = aˆj,t + bj sin(Ωjt+ φj)
Proposition 1. Let ˜ˆat be the interpolated version the trajectory of our algorithm
at time t aˆt is the trajectory of the the ODE at time t. Under assumption A2 ˜ˆat
converges to aˆt as step size vanishes.
E sup
t∈[0,T ]
[‖˜ˆat − aˆt‖2] 12 = C˜T
√
λ
Proposition 1 implies theorem 2.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 1] To prove the above proposition we start with a
fixed step size λ > 0.
• Time Scale. Tt =
∑t
k=1 λ = tλ, for t ≥ 0
• The cumulative noise at iteration t ξt =
∑t−1
k=1 λMk+1 = λ
∑t−1
k=1Mk+1
• Define the (affine) interpolated process from {aˆ}k≥0 rewritten as
aˆj,k+1 = aˆj,k + λ(fj(k, aˆk) +Mk+1).
The advantage of the interpolated process is that it is defined for any con-
tinuous time by concatenation. The affine interpolation writes ˜ˆaj,t = aˆj,k +
( t−Tkλ )(aˆj,k+1 − aˆj,k) if t ∈ [kλ, (k + 1)λ[ which is now in continuous time.
Note that constant learning rate or constant step size λt = λ is suitable for many
practical scenarios. It is used for example in numerical analysis: Euler-s Scheme (1st
Order), Runge Kutta’s scheme (4th Order), etc. Our algorithm writes
(∗∗)
{
aˆj,k+1 = aˆj,k + λ(bjzj sin(kˆtΩj + φj))r˜j,t
aj,k+1 = aˆj,k + (bj sin(kˆtΩj + φj))
where λ is a constant learning rate, our aim is to analyze (∗∗) asymptotically when λ
is very small. In order to prove an asymptotic pseudo-trajectory result for constant
learning rate, we need additional assumptions of the sequence generated by the powers.
The key additional assumption is the uniform integrability of that process. We need
the conditions C1 C2, which translate into
- From Remark 4: gradient of the expectation of payoff is bounded
- From Lemma 2: Square of the martingale is bounded
- Uniform Integrability of rj(S, a)
and aˆt is the solution of ˙ˆat = f(t, aˆt) starting from aˆ⌊ t
λ
⌋
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˜ˆaTt+m =
m∑
k=1
(˜ˆaTt+k − ˜ˆaTt+k−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ(fj(⌊
Tt+k−1
λ
⌋,aˆ
⌊
Tt+k−1
λ
⌋
)+Mk+1)
+˜ˆa
⌊
Tt+k−1
λ
⌋
˜ˆaTt+m =
m∑
k=1
(Tt+k − Tt+k−1)fj(⌊Tt+k−1
λ
⌋, aˆ
⌊
Tt+k−1
λ
⌋
)
+
m∑
k=1
λMt+k+1 + ˜ˆaTt
˜ˆaTt+m =
m∑
k=1
∫ Tt+k−1
Tt+k
fj(⌊Tt+k−1
λ
⌋, aˆ
⌊
Tt+k−1
λ
⌋
)ds
+
m∑
k=1
λMt+k+1 + ˜ˆaTt
˜ˆaTt+m =
m∑
k=1
∫ Tt+k−1
Tt+k
fj(⌊Tt+k−1
λ
⌋, aˆ
⌊
Tt+k−1
λ
⌋
)ds
+(ξt+m − ξt) + ˜ˆaTt
˜ˆaTt+m =
m∑
k=1
∫ Tt+k−1
Tt+k
fj(⌊ s
λ
⌋, ˜ˆa⌊ s
λ
⌋)ds
+(ξt+m − ξt) + ˜ˆaTt
Now we use Burkholder’s inequality which states the following: For an α > 0
there exists two constants c1 > 0 and c2 > 0 such that
c1E[
t∑
k=1
‖aˆk − aˆk−1‖2]α/2 ≤ E[sup
m≥t
‖aˆt‖]
≤ c2E[
t∑
k=1
‖aˆk − aˆk−1‖2]α/2
c1E[
t∑
k=1
‖ηˆk − ηˆk−1‖2]α/2 ≤ E[sup
k≤t
‖ηk‖]
≤ c2E[
t∑
k=1
‖ηˆk − ηk‖2]α/2
18
Take ηˆt = λ
∑
k≤m ‖Mt+k‖2 and we use discrete Gronwall inequality which states
that
ǫt+1 ≤ C + L
t∑
k=0
λǫk
ǫt+1 ≤ CeLλt
where ǫt > 0 ∀t ≥ 0
for
ǫk = E[ sup
k′≤k
‖˜ˆaTt+k′ − aˆTt+k′ ‖2]1/2
C = λTK1
√
1 + C20 +
√
λK2(1 + C20 ), L = maxj∈N ES[Lj,S] for some K1,K2 = c2
from the above we deduce that
E[ sup
k′≤k
‖˜ˆaTt+k′ − aˆTt+k′ ‖2]1/2 ≤
√
λCT
K1 = max(c1, c2
√
1 + C20 )
This shows that E[supk′≤k ‖˜ˆaTt+k′ − aˆTt+k′ ‖2]1/2 is bounded and implies Propo-
sition 1. When λ −→ 0 we have a weak convergence of the interpolated process to a
solution of the ODE. The error gap is
√
λCT which vanishes as λ −→ 0.
Appendix B. Conditions for our Example.
Following are some details about how to obtain a∗ for our application.
gi,j , |hi,j |2
g¯i,j , Eggi,j = Eg|hi,j |2
From remark 4 we can write EG
∂γj(G,a
∗)
∂aj
= ∂∂aj EGγj(G, a
∗) = 0. Solving N
equations we have the following matrix form.
a∗ =


a∗1
a∗2
...
a∗N

 , G¯ =


g¯1,1 g¯1,2 · · · g¯1,N
g¯2,1 g¯2,2 · · · g¯2,N
...
...
. . .
...
g¯N,1 g¯N,2 · · · g¯N,N

 , a¯ =


ωg¯1,1
λ − σ2
ωg¯2,2
λ − σ2
...
ωg¯N,N
λ − σ2


The above equation can be written in the compact form as
a∗ = G¯−1a¯
G¯ should be invertible and all the elements in the vector a¯ should be strictly
positive as they are a linear combination of power and gains which are positive. We
can also write ωg¯j,j > λσ
2. For this example we can write
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EG[gj,j ] >
∑
j′ 6=j
EG[gj,j′ ] ∀j, j′ 6= j
If this condition is satisfied then G¯ is invertible.
As G is a matrix of random channel gains it is almost surely invertible. To show
the invertibility of this matrix we just need to show that the det(G¯) 6= 0
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